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The fluctuations in the balance of power between labor and man-
agement during the last fifty years reflect the unstable positions which
both the federal judiciary and the Congress have taken in developing a
national labor policy. A crucial element in striking this delicate balance
between labor and management has been the availability of injunctive
relief to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. One of the most fre-
quently litigated issues in this context has been management's ability to
obtain injunctive relief when the union is engaging in a work stoppage
solely in deference to another union's picket line-the "sympathy
strike." I In resolving this issue the federal courts have been confronted
with the difficult task of accommodating the anti-injunction provision of
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 2 with both the broad remedial
authority granted the federal courts under section 301 of the Taft-
Hartley Act 3 and the strong judicial policy favoring the peaceful resolu-
tion of labor disputes through compulsory arbitration.
4
1. See NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
2. Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), provides:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case
involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person
or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms
are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in
any relation of employment;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved
in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, pa-
trolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or vio-
lence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in
promotion of their interests in a labor dispute; ....
3. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organi-
zation, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
4. Following the enactment of § 301, the Supreme Court had pointed to the
"basic policy of national labor legislation to promote the arbitral process,"
1
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The difficulty encountered by the federal courts in accommodating
these legislative and judicial mandates is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's inability over the last twenty years to define precisely the con-
tours of this accommodation process when management has sought in-
junctive relief. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson5 the Supreme Court
concluded that the broad language of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act absolutely prohibited the federal courts from enjoining strikes and
peaceful picketing. Only eight years later, however, Sinclair was over-
ruled in the landmark decision Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770,6 in which the Court held that federal courts could enjoin strikes
arising over grievances which were the subject of mandatory grievance
and arbitration procedures of a collective bargaining agreement. Yet, in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers 7 the Supreme Court concluded
that a "sympathy strike" did not subvert the arbitration process and
therefore injunctive relief was barred under section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act despite the presence of an express no-strike clause and
mandatory arbitation procedures in the collective bargaining agreement.
Although the principles espoused in both Sinclair and Boys Markets
were of general applicability in examining the propriety of injunctive
relief where a union is striking, Buffalo Forge represents the Court's first
attempt to address specifically the availability of injunctive relief to re-
strain a "sympathy strike." However, in reaffirming the vitality of the
anti-injunction provision of section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and
deemphasizing the presence of a no-strike clause and mandatory arbit-
ration procedures, the Court in Buffalo Forge obscured, rather than
clarified, the contours of the accommodation process.
The resulting uncertainty created by the Court's decision in Buffalo
Forge has generated considerable confusion over the availability of in-
junctive relief in the context of a sympathy strike. The traditional prin-
ciples of equity limit the issuance of an injunction in all cases. It is the
purpose of this comment, however, to examine only whether section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts from granting injunc-
tive relief to restrain sympathy strikes. The initial focus of this inquiry
Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962), and had uni-
formly required parties to adhere to the grievance and arbitration provisions of
their agreements. Similarly, in the Steelworkers Trilogy, a series of decisions
handed down in 1960, the Supreme Court emphasized congressional intent to
encourage labor and management to resolve their differences peacefully through
a system of private and consensual arbitration. United Steelworkers of America
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers of
America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
5. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
6. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
7. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
[Vol. 43
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will be a consideration of relevant legislative and judicial history. Fol-
lowing that will be an analysis of recent judicial decisions dealing with
the availability of injunctive relief. A third and final discussion will con-
sider various guidelines and strategies which might prove useful as al-
ternative remedies to employers confronted with a sympathy strike.
II. LEGISLATIvE FRAMEwoRK
The controversy over the availability of injunctive relief to restrain
sympathy strikes is primarily a product of the long established tension
between the anti-injunction proscriptions of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and the remedial authority granted the federal courts in
section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. Thus, to understand fully the
current dilemma faced by the courts in resolving this issue, it is impor-
tant to examine the political, social, and economic contexts in which
these statutes were enacted, as well as the particular problems sought to
be corrected by each.
A. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
Prior to 1932, federal judges liberally issued ex parte restraining
orders directed at all phases of union activity.8 This "government by
injunction" 9 was severely criticized as an unwarranted intrusion by the
federal judiciary into labor-management disputes. In response to this
perceived abuse of the federal courts' equitable powers, Congress
enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 10 The primary thrust of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act, as evinced in section 2 thereof, is to insulate labor
from undue coercion by management and to protect labor's ability to
organize the work force effectively." This policy is in part im-
8. Often the injunctive writs were drafted in broad, vague terms, restricting
the use of union strike funds, S. REP. No. 163-1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17
(1932), the enforcement of union by-laws, Borderland Coal Corp. v. UMW, 275
F. 871, 873 (D. Ind. 1921), depriving employees of the benefits of state laws, S.
REP. No. 163-1, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1932), and of free speech, United
States v. Taliaferro, 290 F. 214, 216 (W.D. Va. 1922), aff'd, 290 F. 906 (4th Cir.
1923).
9. Mr. Justice Brennan, author of the dissent in Sinclair and author of the
majority opinion in Boys Markets, characterized this abuse as "the at-largeness of
federal judges in enjoining activities to seek 'unlawful end' or constitute 'unlaw-
ful means'...." Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 251
(1970). See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1932).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1970).
11. Section 2 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970), provides:
[T]he public policy of the United States is declared as follows:
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, ... the individual
unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to ob-
19781
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plemented by section 4 of the Act, which severely restricts the availability
of injunctive relief by eliminating the federal courts' jurisdiction to en-
join certain labor activities, including strikes.12
B. The Taft-Hartley Act
Under the protective umbrella of Norris-LaGuardia and with the
passage of the Wagner Act 13 in 1935, labor unions became powerful and
cohesive units. It soon became apparent, however, that in attempting to
establish a balance of power between labor and management, Congress
had skewed its policies too far in favor of labor. With management's
most effective weapon, the injunction, defused, unions violated collective
bargaining agreements with relative impunity. By 1947 the nation's
economy was seriously impaired by a multitude of illegal union strikes. 14
Congress responded with the enactment in 1947 of the Taft-Hartley
Act15 which forbade as unfair labor practices the unions' oft-used tactics
of the jurisdictional strike and the secondary boycott.16 Additionally,
section 301(a) of the Act granted federal courts jurisdiction to entertain
suits relating to alleged violations of collective bargaining agreements
without regard to either the diversity of citizenship or amount in con-
troversy jurisdictional requirements. 1 7
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
A. Section 301(a)-Judicial Expansion and Interpretation
Section 301(a) appears to have been enacted purely as a jurisdic-
tional device designed to create a federal forum to entertain suits for
violations of collective bargaining agreements. Prior to the enactment of
section 301(a), employers faced considerable procedural obstacles in en-
tain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore ...
it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, self-organi-
zation, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to
negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he
shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such rep-
resentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
12. See note 2 supra.
13. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970).
14. Figures issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that the number of
strikes doubled between 1932 and 1933 and had increased nearly sixfold by
1937. See generally R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, & T. ST. ANTOINE, LABOR RELA-
TIONS LAW 1-53 (5th ed. 1974).
15. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
17. See note 3 supra.
(Vol. 43
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forcing labor contracts in state courts. This was due primarily to various
common law rules which made it difficult to secure service of process
upon the unions, which were unincorporated associations. 18 Similarly,
the diversity and amount in controversy requirements had consistently
prevented the employer from vindicating his contract rights in federal
court.19 With both the state and federal forums effectively foreclosed to
the employer, it had become evident that only legislative intervention
could resolve the problem. In 1947 Congress enacted section 301(a) in
order to remove the federal jurisdictional barriers, thereby creating a
federal forum to settle employers' contract grievances.20
Although section 301(a) was uniformly accepted as a jurisdictional
device designed to expand the availability of the federal forum, a split of
authority soon developed among the lower federal courts as to whether
section 301(a) was substantive in nature as well. The Supreme Court re-
jected the contention that section 301(a) was intended to authorize the
creation of a body of "federal common law" to resolve labor disputes.2 '
In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.,22 Justice Frankfurter concluded from a lengthy analysis of the
pertinent legislative history that section 301(a) was purely procedural in
nature. Federal courts acquiring jurisdiction under section 301(a) were
therefore bound by the Erie doctrine to apply state and not federal law
in resolving substantive issues. 23 While Frankfurter's arguments were
persuasive, 24 the Court in Westinghouse was able to decide the case on
other grounds and thus was not compelled to resolve the procedural-
substantive dichotomy of section 301(a).25
18. The major difficulty in obtaining relief against labor unions lay in the
fact that voluntary unincorporated associations, such as most labor unions, were
not suable as an entity at common law. Rather, to sue a union each individual
member of the union had to be named, made a party to the suit, and served
with process. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1955). The unions, of course, did not have a
similar problem. The employers, as corporations, were easily amenable to process
in state court. See Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses:
From Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv. 32, 34 (1969).
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1970).
20. See note 3 supra.
21. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 443-49. See also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24. Justices Burton and Minton joined in Justice Frankfurter's plurality
opinion. 348 U.S. at 438.
25. The issue before the Court was whether the union had standing under §
301(a) to maintain an action on the behalf of some of its individual members.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter concluded that § 301(a) did not extend jurisdiction to
the present case because the legislative history of § 301 reinforced the argument
that § 301(a) was merely procedural in nature, and the absence of any substan-
1978]
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In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,26 however, the Court fo-
cused directly on the scope of section 301(a) and ruled that it "authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of
these collective bargaining agreements. '27  The Court subsequently
noted in Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 28 that the purpose of sec-
tion 301(a) was to promote nationwide uniformity in suits over collective
bargaining agreements through the availability of the federal forum, and
therefore "doctrines of federal labor law [should] uniformly ... prevail
over inconsistent local rules." 
29
Given this view of section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, a question
also arose whether federal jurisdiction over labor relations suits was
exclusive or merely concurrent. In Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney 30 the
Court, relying heavily upon the legislative history of section 301, con-
cluded that the "basic purpose of section 301(a) was not to limit, but to
expand, the availability of forums for the enforcement of contracts made
by labor organizations." 3 1 Therefore, despite the petitioner's claim that
section 301(a) had divested the state courts of jurisdiction in labor dis-
putes, the Court held that the state courts were empowered under sec-
tion 301 to exercise jurisdiction over labor disputes concurrently with the
federal judiciary. 32  However, compliance with the dictates of Lincoln
Mills and Lucas Flour required a state court exercising jurisdiction over a
section 301 labor dispute to apply federal and not state law to resolve
the substantive issues.
B. Accommodation of Taft-Hartley
and Norris-LaGuardia Acts
In fashioning a remedy in section 301(a) suits, federal courts were
forced to consider the scope of the prohibition in section 4 of the Nor-
tive federal issues would render the exercise of jurisdiction under § 301(a) un-
constitutional under article III. The concurring justices, however, characterized
the issue merely as one of statutory interpretation and concluded that § 301(a)
did not authorize a union to enforce in a federal court the uniquely personal
rights of employees. Id. at 461 (Warren, C.J. & Clark, J., concurring).
26. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
27. Id. at 451.
28. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
29. Id. at 104.
30. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
31. Id. at 508-09. The Court relied heavily upon the legislative history of the
Act, particularly the statement of Senator Furgeson, a spokesman for the bill,
who stated during the 1946 debates that the bill "takes away no jurisdiction of
the State courts." 92 CONG. REc. 5708 (1946). The questions whether the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act might be applicable to a suit brought in a state court for a
union's violation of a labor agreement, and whether such a suit could be re-
moved to a federal court were expressly reserved for future disposition. 368 U.S.
at 514.
32. 368 U.S. at 508-09.
[Vol. 43
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ris-LaGuardia Act against enjoining strikes. Prior to addressing this issue
with respect to section 301(a) labor disputes, the Supreme Court had
considered the scope of section 4 in other contexts. In Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & Indiana Railroad 33 the union struck
rather than submitting a dispute to arbitration as was mandated by the
Railway Labor Act.3 4  In upholding the issuance of an injunction, the
Supreme Court refused to adhere to the literal wording of section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Court stated that it was necessary to ac-
commodate the two statutes (Norris-LaGuardia and Railway Labor Acts)
and that, where the union was under a statutory duty to arbitrate a dis-
pute, the anti-injunction prohibition of section 4 was inapplicable. 35
The first attempt by the Court to clarify the scope of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act in a section 301(a) suit arose in a non-strike context. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills 36 the employer refused a union's
request to arbitrate a dispute even though the collective bargaining
agreement between them provided a special procedure which expressly
included arbitration.3 7 The Court held that section 301(a) authorized
the federal courts to employ equitable relief to enforce labor agreements
and ordered specific performance of the arbitration clause by the
employer. 38 The Court emphasized that the employer's agreement to
arbitrate grievance disputes was the quid pro quo for the union's agree-
ment not to strike.3 9 Thus, the Court concluded that industrial peace
could best be obtained by holding the parties strictly to their bargain.
Having found that section 301(a) authorized the federal courts to
grant equitable relief, the Court next addressed the possible conflict with
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Section 7 of the Act prescribes strict pro-
cedural requirements 40 which, unlike section 4, are of general applica-
bility to the issuance of an injunction in labor disputes. 41 In rejecting
the contention that section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibited this
type of relief, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the "failure to
arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which [that] Act
was aimed." 42 Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the congres-
33. 353 U.S. 30 (1957).
34. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970).
35. 353 U.S. at 40.
36. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
37. The collective bargaining agreement between the parties provided that
there would be no strikes or work stoppages and that grievances would be
handled pursuant to a specified procedure. The last step in the procedure, a
step that could be taken by either party, was arbitration. 353 U.S. at 449.
38. Id. at 451.
39. "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes is the quid pro quo
for an agreement not to strike." Id. at 455.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).
41. While § 4 is limited by its terms to prohibiting injunctive relief against
union activities, § 7 is applicable equally to both union and management ac-
tivities.
42. 353 U.S. at 458.
1978]
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sional policy evinced in section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act favored
the settlement of labor disputes by arbitration. 43 Viewed in this light,
Lincoln Mills established an important precedent whereby the Court ac-
commodated the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts by refusing to
adhere to the literal wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and instead
focusing on the policy favoring the resolution of labor-management dis-
putes through arbitration.
In 1962, however, the United States Supreme Court announced a
decision which appeared contradictory to the policies espoused in Lincoln
Mills. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson 44 the Court held that section 4
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred federal district courts from enjoin-
ing work stoppages and peaceful picketing which were the subject of a
section 301(a) suit. In Sinclair the employer sought to enjoin a series of
strikes which arose over a grievance clearly subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedures under the collective bargaining agreement. In
addition to these provisions for compulsory, final, and binding arbitra-
tion, the collective bargaining agreement also contained a clause in which
the union agreed not to strike over any cause which was or might have
been the subject of a grievance. Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Court,
concluded that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was intended to forestall in-
junctive relief in precisely this type of situation. The Court relied heavily
upon the fact that Congress had not intended to repeal or otherwise
narrow section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act when it passed section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 45 Thus, what Congress
had refused to do explicitly or implicitly the Court refused to do
through the accommodation process. 46  Mr. Justice Brennan dissented
and argued that even though section 301(a) did not repeal section 4 of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, granting the injunction would not result in
the judicial abuse which prompted the Norris-LaGuardia Act and there-
fore a 'Judicial accommodation" should be sought. 47
43. Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act denies injunctive relief to any per-
son who has failed to make "every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either
by negotiation ... mediation or voluntary arbitration." 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970).
44. 370 U.S. 195 (1962), overruled, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local
770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
45. In reviewing the legislative history of § 301(a), the Court noted that al-
though the bill passed by the House of Representatives had expressly provided
for the repeal of section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia in a § 301 suit, the Senate bill
had provided that only the NLRB could enjoin breaches of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. Following joint conference, Senator Taft, chairman of the
Conference Committee, stated that neither the House nor Senate provisions had
been adopted and that "[t]he Conferees ... rejected the repeal of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act." 93 CONG. REc. 6445-56 (1947), quoted in 370 U.S. at 208. Ac-
cordingly, the majority in Sinclair concluded that § 301 had neither explicitly nor
implicitly repealed § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
46. 370 U.S. at 209-10.
47. Conceding that "§ 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act did not, for purposes of
actions brought under it, 'repeal' § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act . .. ," Mr.
[Vol. 43
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The Sinclair decision quickly received severe criticism by commen-
tators as being inconsistent with the underlying bases of federal labor
policies. 48  Indeed, discontent over the decision surfaced within the
Supreme Court itself.49 Eight years after Sinclair was decided, the Court
reevaluated its position and overruled that decision in the landmark case
of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770.50
The collective bargaining agreement in Boys Markets contained a
mandatory grievance procedure which provided for the submission of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of the
agreement to binding arbitration. 51 In addition, the collective bargain-
ing agreement provided that there could be no cessation or stoppage of
work, lock-outs, picketing, or boycotts, except where either party failed
to perform a contract provision or to abide by an arbitral award.5 2 The
dispute arose when a nonunion store supervisor rearranged a frozen
food case. When the company refused to comply with the union's de-
mands to restock the food case using union personnel, Local 770 struck
and established picket lines. The employer brought suit in state court
where a temporary restraining order was issued forbidding continued
participation in the strike. The union then removed the case to federal
district court where a preliminary injunction was granted. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, relying primarily on the Sinclair deci-
sion.
Overruling Sinclair, the Supreme Court held that injunctive relief
was not barred by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.53 Mr. Justice
Brennan, author of the Sinclair dissent, wrote the opinion of the Court
and concluded that "Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our
Justice Brennan recognized that "the two provisions do co-exist, [and] ... that
they apply to the case before us in apparently conflicting senses." Id. at 215-16.
Therefore, Justice Brennan sought a 'judicial accommodation," id. at 224, which
would "give the fullest possible effect to the central purposes of both ... ." Id. at
216.
48. See, e.g., Keene, The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From
Lincoln Mills to Avco and Beyond, 15 VILL. L. REv. 32 (1969); Kiernan, Availability
of Injunctions Against Breaches of No-Strike Agreements in Labor Contracts, 32 ALB. L.
Rxv. 303 (1968); Wellington, The No-Strike Clause and the Labor Injunction: Time for
a Re-examination, 30 U. Prrr. L. REv. 293 (1968); Wellington & Albert, Statutory
Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE
L.J. 1547 (1963).
49. Mr. Justice Douglas stated that Sinclair had "caused a severe dislocation
in the federal scheme of arbitration," International Longshoremen's Assoc. Local
1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Assoc., 389 U.S. 64, 77 (1967) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), and later, Mr. Justice Stewart stated
that the Court should "reconsider the scope and continuing validity of Sinclair."
Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 562 (1968) (Stewart, J., con-
curring).
50. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
51. 398 U.S. at 238-39 n.3.
52. Id. at 239 n.4.
53. Id. at 238.
1978]
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otherwise consistent emphasis upon the congressional policy to promote
the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration... .,54
The Court gave two reasons for its holding. First, the Court recog-
nized that Sinclair had achieved the anomalous result of depriving state
courts of jurisdiction over labor disputes. 55 Although most state courts
had jurisdiction to enjoin a strike which violated a collective bargaining
agreement providing for mandatory arbitration of unresolved contract
disputes, the Court in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735 6 had held that
state court suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements could be
removed to the federal courts under the federal removal statute. 57  Al-
though the Court in Avco did not decide whether federal courts would
be required upon removal to dissolve extant state court injunctions in
view of Sinclair, this position was soon adopted by the lower federal
courts.58  Consequently, the decision in Sinclair, coupled with the result
54. Id. at 241. The majority concluded that Sinclair had undermined the cor-
nerstone of the federal labor policy-mandatory arbitration of grievances-by
dissipating employer incentive to accept arbitration clauses. Id. at 248.
55. Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), had stated that § 301
was enacted to supplement, not supplant, state court jurisdiction. See text accom-
panying notes 30 & 31 supra.
56. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
57. Id. at 560. The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1970), pro-
vides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire
case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues
therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
In an attempt to avoid removal under this provision, employers faced with
strikes in violation of the collective bargaining agreement frequently excluded
claims for damages in suits for injunctive relief brought in state courts.
Employers believed that a claim merely for injunctive relief would be beyond the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts because the language of § 4 of Norris-
LaGuardia restricted the jurisdiction granted the federal courts under § 301 of
Taft-Hartley: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order .. " In Avco, however, the Court held that a suit to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement would invoke original jurisdiction under § 301
irrespective of the particular relief sought.
58. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Local 191, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers, 413 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1969). The court affirmed dissolution of
a state court-issued injunction following removal of the action to a federal district
court, saying:
We are of the view that the District Court did not err in dissolving
the injunction, not because either either [sic] Sinclair ... or Avco ...
explicitly dictates that result, but because, in our view, once this case
was removed, a failure to dissolve the state court injunction would
have been tantamount to issuance of that same injunction by the
federal district court, which, as we have just noted, would be pro-
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in Avco, as a practical matter deprived the state courts of jurisdiction by
encouraging the removal of all state court suits to federal court. Faced
with the task of maintaining concurrent state and federal jurisdiction, 59
the Court in Boys Markets found it necessary to "accommodate" the literal
terms of section 4 with its interpretations of the subsequently enacted
section 301(a). Thus, in approving the issuance of injunctive relief in
federal court, the Supreme Court eliminated one of the more important
incentives to remove state court actions to federal court, and thereby
preserved the parity of the federal and state courts' jurisdiction to re-
solve labor disputes.
The second articulated basis for the Boys Markets decision was that
the decision in Sinclair was inconsistent with the federal labor policy
favoring arbitration as the preferred method of settling disputes. In
Lincoln Mills the Court had noted that the employer's promise to submit
disputes to binding arbitration was the quid pro quo for the union's
agreement not to strike. 60  With employers deprived of their most po-
tent weapon for enforcing the no-strike clause, 61 Mr. Justice Brennan
concluded that there would be little incentive to accept arbitration
clauses in negotiating collective bargaining agreements. 62  Employers
would be wary of assuming obligations to arbitrate, which under Lincoln
Mills were specifically enforceable against them, when no "similarly ef-
ficacious remedy is available to enforce the concomitant undertaking of
the union to refrain from striking." 63
Having concluded that the result in Sinclair was unsatisfactory, the
Court was careful to define the limits of this newly created exception to
section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. First, the Court stressed the "nar-
rowness" 64 of its holding by stating that it was dealing "only with the
situation in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a mandatory
grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." 65  Second, the Court
adopted the principles advanced in Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in Sinclair that injunctive relief should be granted if the strike is
over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbit-
rate.66 Third, the Court made it clear that it did not intend to "under-
mine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." 67
59. See note 55 supra.
60. See note 39 supra.
61. The Court quite properly concluded that an action for damages was not
an effective means of enforcing the no-strike obligation. The Court stated that
"an award for damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an
immediate halt to an illegal strike." 398 U.S. at 248.
62. Id. at 248.
63. Id. at 252.
64. Id. at 253.
65. Id.
66. A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant
injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides
that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate
1978]
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IV. AVAILABILITY OF Boys MARKETS INJUNCTIONS
To RESTRAIN SYMPATHY STRIKES
Even though Boys Markets took an important step toward delineating
the boundaries of the "accommodation" of section 4 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act and section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, it soon be-
came apparent that the Court's adoption of the standards espoused by
Justice Brennan in his Sinclair dissent was inadequate to resolve many of
the complex issues raised by the expanded role of injunctive relief in the
scheme of federal labor law. Of particular importance was the unre-
solved conflict over whether injunctive relief was available in the context
of a "sympathy strike."
In Boys Markets the union went on strike over a dispute which was
clearly an issue which both parties had agreed to submit to the grievance
arbitration procedures. In the context of a sympathy strike, however, the
underlying dispute concerns the validity of the refusal to cross a picket
line established by employees from a different bargaining unit.6 8 Con-
sequently, the employees engaging in a sympathy strike are not refusing
to work because of a dispute they have with the employer; rather, their
refusal to cross another picket line is itself the dispute.
In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate in a sym-
pathy strike, the Courts of Appeals have disagreed over the significance
to be given to the fact that the sympathy strike is not over an underlying
dispute between the employer and the sympathetically striking union.
The primary differences have concerned the interpretation of Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan's statement in Sinclair and Boys Markets that before a strike
can be enjoined, the district court must find that the strike is "over a
grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate.""6
A. Division of the Circuit Courts
In resolving this difficult issue the Third, Fourth, and Eighth Cir-
cuits have adopted an expansive view of Boys Markets and thus have
despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be en-
joined because it is over a grievance which both parties are contrac-
tually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive
order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and
the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his
obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District
Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction
would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity.
Id. at 254.
67. Id. at 253.
68. See text accompanying note 1 supra. Indeed, a sympathy strike is not
limited to the honoring of picket lines at the employer's plant, but may extend to
employee refusals to cross picket lines established at nonemployer plants.
69. 398 U.S. at 254.
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permitted the issuance of injunctions to restrain sympathy strikes.7 0
The rationale underlying this position is exemplified by the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision in Monongahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local 2332.71 The
contract involved in that case contained an express no-strike clause as
well as a mandatory grievance arbitration procedure .7  The court stated
that the breadth of the grievance and arbitration provision contained in
the collective bargaining agreement made it clear that a dispute over
whether a refusal to cross nonbargaining-unit picket lines was a violation
of the no-strike clause was arbitrable.7 3 Because the scope of the no-
strike clause was itself an arbitrable issue, the court reasoned that a Boys
Markets injunction could then issue to enjoin the strike. This position
expands the scope of the Boys Markets decision by interpreting the re-
quirement that the strike be "over an arbitrable issue" to require only
that the validity of the strike itself be arbitrable.
The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, have
adopted a more restrictive view of Boys Markets and have consistently
refused to issue injunctions to restrain sympathy strikes.74 This position
is best illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Amstar Corp. v. Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters.7 5 The court refused to issue an injunction in that
case, ruling that the strike was not "over" an arbitrable issue, and thus
not enjoinable under Boys Markets because the validity of the strike
sought to be enjoined was itself the arbitrable dispute.7 6 This position is
more restrictive than the Monongahela Power interpretation of Boys Mar-
kets in that it requires that the arbitrable dispute be the underlying cause
of the strike to be enjoined.7 7
The Seventh Circuit has not formulated a clear position on this
issue. It initially sustained an injunction to restrain a sympathy strike,
70. See, e.g., Valmac Indus. Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263
(8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 906 (1976); Associated Gen. Contractors v. In-
ternational Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 49, 519 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1975);
Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877
(1975); Armco Steel Corp. v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1975); NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local
926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
71. 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973).
72. Id. at 1210-11
73. Id. at 1213-14.
74. See, e.g., Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union
No. 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1976); Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 428 U.S.
397 (1976); Amstar Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir.
1972).
75. 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972).
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stating that the "exceptionally broad arbitration clause is itself expansive
enough to encompass the present disputes."7 8 Yet, in two subsequently
decided cases the Seventh Circuit distinguished its earlier position on the
grounds that the language of the arbitration clause was not as broad as
the clause in the earlier case.79 In these latter decisions, the Seventh
Circuit concluded that not only was injunctive relief inappropriate but
also that the validity of the sympathy strike was not an arbitrable issue.80
B. Response of the Supreme Court
In order to resolve the split among the circuits on this issue, the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify its position taken in Boys Markets. In
Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers81 production and maintenance
employees honored picket lines established at their employer's plants by
"office clerical-technical" employees during an economic strike. The
production and maintenance employees were parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement which contained an express no-strike clause and pro-
vided a mandatory grievance-arbitration procedure covering "differences
... as to the meaning and application of the provisions of [the] Agree-
ment" and "any trouble of any kind" arising at the plant.8 2
The employer brought suit under section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley
Act, claiming that the strike by production and maintenance employees
was a violation of the express no-strike clause and contending in the
alternative that the question whether the work stoppage violated the no-
strike clause was itself arbitrable. The employer requested both injunc-
tive relief and damages.83 The union asserted that the work stoppage
did not violate the no-strike clause. 84
The district court in Buffalo Forge found that the production and
maintenance employees were engaged in a sympathy strike in support of
the striking office clerical-technical employees. The district court then
held that section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act forbade the issuance of
an injunction because the production and maintenance employees' strike
was not over an arbitrable grievance and thus was not within the narrow
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act established in Boys Markets.15
The Second Circuit affirmed.
8 6
78. Inland Steel Co. v. Local 1545, UMW, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974).
79. See Hyster Co. v. Independant Towing Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Gary Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511
F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
80. See cases cited note 79 supra.
81. 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
82. Id. at 400.
83. Id. at 401.
84. Id. at 402.
85. Id. at 402-03.
86. Id. at 403. See 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975).
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In affirming the decision of the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that Boys Markets injunctions are limited to situations in which a
strike has been "precipitated by" or is "over" an arbitrable dispute be-
tween the employer and the striking union.8 7 The Court distinguished
the factual setting in Buffalo Forge from that in Boys Markets. A distinc-
tion was drawn between Boys Markets in which a strike was "precipitated
by a dispute ... subject to binding arbitration under the provisions of
the contract," and Buffalo Forge, in which the validity of the strike "in
support of sister unions negotiation with the employer," 9 was itself the
arbitrable issue. Thus, the Court concluded that Boys Markets was not
controlling.
In addition to distinguishing the factual setting in Buffalo Forge from
that in Boys Markets, the Court also propounded several policy justifica-
tions for its holding. First, the Court noted that the sympathy strike had
not "deprived the employer of his bargain." 90 The basis for this finding
was the Court's rather narrow definition of the employer's quid pro quo as
only the "union's obligation not to strike over issues that were subject to
the arbitration machinery." 91
A second policy consideration espoused by the majority focused on
the congressional intent in enacting section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
The Court stated that section 301 was intended to implement the strong
congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mechanisms
agreed upon by the parties. 92 Thus, where the sympathy strike at issue
"had neither the purposes nor the effect of denying or evading an obli-
gation to arbitrate,"93 the purpose of section 301 was not subverted by
refusing to enjoin such a strike. 94 The Court stated:
Section 301 of the Act assigns a major role to the courts in
enforcing collective-bargaining agreements, but aside from the
enforcement of the arbitration provisions of such contracts,
within the limits permitted by Boys Markets, the Court has never
indicated that the courts may enjoin actual or threatened con-
tract violations despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act.95
Therefore, the majority concluded that, if the policy of encouraging ar-
bitration is not served, there is no authority for the federal courts to
promote a "general federal anti-strike policy." 96
87. 428 U.S. at 404.
88. Id. at 407.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 408.
91. Id. at 407.
92. Id. at 409, 411-12.
93. Id. at 408.
94. Id.




Cupples: Cupples: Labor Law--Availability of Injunctive Relief to Restrain Sympathy Strikes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1978
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
A third policy consideration noted by the majority in Buffalo Forge
was the concern that a preliminary injunction restraining a sympathy
strike would involve a 'judicial preview" of the facts in the dispute and
would improperly infringe upon the arbitrator's role by effectively
preempting the arbitrator's independent interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement.9 7  Additionally, the Court expressed a concern
that expanding the issuance of injunctions beyond the narrow limits of
Boys Markets would "embroil" the already overburdened federal courts
with "massive" preliminary injunction litigation. 9
The dissenters in Buffalo Forge,99 conceding that Boys Markets did not
by the terms of its narrow holding require the issuance of an injunction
in Buffalo Forge, argued that the literal wording of section 4 of the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act did not prohibit injunctive relief in the context of a
sympathy strike. Furthermore, the dissenters advanced several persua-
sive arguments which refuted the majority's policy justifications for de-
nying injunctive relief.
In reviewing the legislative history of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the
dissenters concluded that the purpose of the Act was to "foster the
growth and viability of labor organizations." 100 Therefore, the dissen-
ters argued that an extension of Boys Markets was not hindered by the
literal terms of the Norris-LaGuardia Act because the central concerns of
that Act were not threatened. At this level, the dissent's point is well-
taken because the majority's strict adherence to the literal wording of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act disregards the underlying purposes of the Act.
Norris-LaGuardia was responsive to the federal judiciary's abuses of its
equitable powers and was adopted to deprive federal judges of the au-
thority to issue injunctions in furtherance of management's attempts to
interfere with union development. °1 ' The enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements freely entered into between the parties was not
one of the abuses sought to be corrected by Congress. Rather, as the
dissenters in Buffalo Forge recognized, one of the fundamental goals of
both the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts was to allow the par-
ties freedom to engage in the collective bargaining process 10 2 and to
leave the enforcement of bargaining agreements to the "usual processes
of law." 103
In addition to challenging the majority's apparent disregard of the
policies underlying the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the dissenters also at-
97. Id. at 412.
98. Id. at 411 n.12.
99. Mr. Justice Stevens authored the dissent and was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell.
100. 428 U.S. at 417.
101. Id. at 416. See generally F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, supra note 9.
102. 428 U.S. at 417, 415-16 n.6.
103. Id. at 420.
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tacked the validity of the majority's premise that a sympathy strike did
not frustrate the arbitration process. First, the dissenters expressly re-
jected the majority's analysis which characterized the employer's quid pro
quo as extending only to the union's agreement not to strike over arbitrable
issues. Rather, the dissenters noted that the employer usually bargains
for a broad, unlimited no-strike clause. Thus, even conceding that a
sympathy strike does not circumvent the arbitration process, the dissen-
ters contended that the inability to obtain preliminary injunctive relief
would "frustrate the more basic policy of motivating employers to agree
to binding arbitration" 104 by limiting the employer's ability to ensure
uninterrupted production. At this level, the majority's refusal to expand
Boys Markets to the sympathy strike context ignores the creation of a
strong disincentive for employers to agree to submit disputes to arbitra-
tion in exchange for the union's promise not to strike.
In refuting the majority's policy justifications for denying injunctive
relief, the dissenters also maintained that the majority's concern over the
usurpation of the arbitrator's role by the federal judiciary was largely
illusory because the arbitator's final decision is not precluded by an
interim determination by the court. Rather, a preliminary injunction
would merely maintain the status quo and preserve the arbitrator's abil-
ity to make a meaningful determination of the merits of the dispute.
The dissenters also noted that the risk of an "erroneously issued injunc-
tion" against a lawful strike was not more likely in the Buffalo Forge con-
text than that to which the unions had been subjected under Boys Mar-
kets. 105
Even though the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge eliminated con-
tinued confusion over the issue of the enjoinability of sympathy strikes,
the decision is unsatisfactory. It would appear that the Court failed to
recognize the substantial policies supporting the issuance of injunctive
relief to compel performance of the union's no-strike obligations. Fur-
thermore, the Court did not articulate persuasive reasons for denying
such relief. Therefore, Buffalo Forge is not only a significant retreat from
the principles set forth in Boys Markets, but it stands as a significant hur-
dle to the development of a sound federal labor policy.
C. Impact of Buffalo Forge on Existing Contracts
In assessing the impact of Buffalo Forge on the availability under
existing labor contracts of injunctive relief to restrain a sympathy strike,
three basic factual patterns emerge which are useful for analytical pur-
poses. The first and perhaps most complex pattern consists of contracts
which expressly forbid sympathy strikes and which provide a mandatory
grievance and arbitration procedure. Focusing on the Boys Markets con-
104. Id. at 424.
105. Id. at 430.
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cern with the frustration of the arbitral process, the Court in Buffalo
Forge made it clear that Boys Markets had not authorized the district
courts to issue injunctions against strikes merely because those strikes
were alleged to be violations of the labor contract.'06  The Court read
Boys Markets to authorize injunctions against strikes that not only violated
the labor contract but also frustrated the congressional preference for
arbitration.' 07 It was the inability to satisfy this latter requirement which
contributed substantially to the employer's failure in Buffalo Forge to ob-
tain injunctive relief. Whether a sympathy strike in violation of an ex-
press no-sympathy strike clause, unlike the general no-strike clause in
Buffalo Forge, would similarly fail to frustrate the arbitration process is
uncertain. In Buffalo Forge the majority emphasized the fact that the dis-
pute in Boys Markets was clearly in violation of the no-strike clause.' 08
This finding would appear to be much more likely in the presence of an
express no-sympathy strike clause than with the general no-strike clause
present in Buffalo Forge. Additionally, the majority in Buffalo Forge em-
phasized the fact that the sympathy strike did not have the effect of
depriving the employer of his bargain.10 9 Although such a conclusion is
questionable, 1 0 the presence of an express no-sympathy strike clause
would appear to dispel any doubts about the employer's quid pro quo and
should compel a finding that the employer would be deprived of his
bargain if injunctive relief were denied.
If these were the only relevant factors to be considered, it might
follow'that a sympathy strike in violation of an express no-sympathy
strike clause would frustrate the congressional preference for arbitration
and therefore warrant injunctive relief. It is important to note, however,
that Mr. Justice Stevens suggested such an argument in the dissenting
opinion to Buffalo Forge, whereby injunctive relief should be authorized
if there is "convincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-
strike clause.""' The majority expressly rejected this as a viable solu-
tion, noting that the arbitrator might be unduly influenced by a judicial
finding, however preliminary, of illegality of the strike." 2 Whether this
last consideration espoused by the Court in Buffalo Forge will prove fatal
to obtaining injunctive relief in federal court is, however, a question
which has not been directly resolved." 3 Furthermore, if Buffalo Forge is
narrowly read to allow injunctions only when the strike is over an arbi-
106. Id. at 409.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 406.
109. Id. at 408.
110. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
111. 428 U.S. at 431.
112. Id. at 412.
113. Although no court has yet addressed the factual pattern of the express
no-sympathy strike clause, some courts have denied injunctive relief in the pre-
sence of only "qualified" no-sympathy strike clauses. See note 117 infra.
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trable dispute, an injunction could not be issued even where the contract
expressly prohibits sympathy strikes.
Even assuming injunctive relief is appropriate if the sympathy strike
violates an express no-sympathy strike clause, the employer faces the
more practical problem of determining what language in the no-strike
clause would be sufficient to bring the strike within the narrow excep-
tion described above. Typically, there is a qualification in the collective
bargaining agreement that provides the union with the right to honor
only "primary," 114 "authorized,"' 15 or "bona fide" 6 picket lines. With
such provisions in the collective bargaining agreement, however, the leg-
ality or illegality of the strike may not be clear. Consequently, the risk of
enjoining lawful conduct necessarily would increase, perhaps so much as
to bring the strike back within the Buffalo Forge prohibition of injunctive
relief.' 7 Such a limitation may appear too narrow, but it simply reflects
the heavy burden draftsmen must bear in carefully delineating the pro-
hibited conduct.
The second factual pattern consists of contracts similar to the one
presented in Buffalo Forge which contain a general no-strike clause and a
provision for mandatory arbitration of all grievances. Buffalo Forge
clearly prohibits issuance of an injunction pending arbitration, but it
suggests that, should the arbitrator determine that the strike is illegal, it
could be enjoined at that time." 8 Subsequent to the decision in Buffalo
Forge, an argument was proposed to distinguish that decision on the
grounds that the sympathy strike in Buffalo Forge was in support of a
primary strike which was itself bona fide and legal and that if the prim-
ary strike is illegal the restrictions on the availability of Boys Markets in-
junction should not apply." 9 The general consensus has been to reject
such a distinction. The rationale for this position is explicated in Southern
114. NAPA Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Automotive Chauffeurs Local 926, 502 F.2d
321, 322 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974).
115. Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, 265 n.4
(8th Cir. 1975), vacated, 428 U.S. 906 (1976).
116. Wilmington Shipping, Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 L.R.R.M.
2846, 2847 (4th. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022 (1974).
117. In Valmac Indus., Inc., v. Food Handlers Local 425, 519 F.2d 263, (8th
Cir. 1975), vacated 428 U.S. 906 (1976), the no-strike clause provided: "It shall be
a violation of this Agreement for an employee to refuse to pass through a picket
line authorized by this Union." 519 F.2d at 265 n.4. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court vacated judgment and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for further con-
sideration in light of Buffalo Forge.
118. 428 U.S. at 405. The Court stated: "[W]ere the issue arbitrated and the
strike found illegal, the relevant federal statutes as construed in our cases would
permit an injunction to enforce the arbitral decision." Id.
119. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. UMW, 551 F.2d 695, 704 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 548 F.2d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 1976); Republic
Steel Corp. v. UMW, 428 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers 120 in which the court properly con-
cluded that the focus of its inquiry should not be on the illegal pickets
but rather on the employees against whom the injunction is sought.1 21
The third factual pattern consists of contracts which contain provi-
sions for mandatory arbitration of grievances but which do not contain
an express no-strike clause. Buffalo Forge seems to address this situation
directly where the Court stated that "to the extent that the Courts of
Appeals ... have assumed that a mandatory arbitration clause implies a
commitment not to engage in sympathy strikes, they are wrong." 122
Thus, a court is unquestionably prohibited from issuing an injunction
against a sympathy strike where there is no express no-strike clause.
V. ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO MANAGEMENT
Although Buffalo Forge prohibits the enforcement of a union's no-
strike obligation by the issuance of an injunction prior to the arbitrator's
resolution of the validity of the strike, management might be able to
pursue alternative courses of action. One possible tactic consists of dis-
ciplinary suspension of employees who participate in a sympathy strike.
The dilemma faced is whether the employer thereby subjects himself to
a valid unfair labor practice charge.1 23 In NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co.124
the Seventh Circuit held that the mandatory arbitration clause contained
in the contract covered grievances relating to an alleged violation of the
no-strike clause and that the employees should not have honored the
picket line without first confirming their contractual right to do so
through the grievance and arbitration procedures. 125 Thus, the court
concluded that the employer had not committed an unfair labor practice
when it suspended certain employees who participated in the sympathy
strike. 12 6  This decision appears to provide management with a viable
alternative by utilizing discipline as a deterrent to honoring picket lines
in violation of no-strike clauses.127
120. 551 F.2d 695, 704 (6th Cir. 1977).
121. Id.
122. 428 U.S. at 408 n.10. The importance of an express no-strike clause also
was pointed out in Teledyne Wis. Motor v. Local 283, UAW, 386 F. Supp. 1231(E.D. Wis. 1975), in which the plaintiff urged that a mandatory arbitration clause
was not necessary in support of a Boys Markets injunction, but could be implied
from an express no-strike clause. While the court admitted the possible validity
of the plaintiffs argument, it denied the relief sought upon its finding that there
was no express no-strike clause.
123. The minimum potential risk to the employer could be the award of back
pay to ,improperly suspended or discharged employees.
124. 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976).
125. Id. at 1300.
126. Id.
127. A question is raised whether a sympathy strike is to be afforded the pro-
tection of § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act which protects concerted ac-
tivity for "mutual aid or protection" and "to assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C.
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A second alternative for the employer would be to bring an action
before the NLRB to establish an unfair labor practice by the stranger
pickets. 1 2  This remedy would be available only if the picket line being
honored amounted to a secondary boycott.1 29 If so, the employer may
pursue remedies before the NLRB alleging a violation of section 8(b)(4)
of the National Labor Relations Act.1 3 0 The Board is required to give
expedited treatment to a secondary boycott charge, and, if there is
"reasonable cause to believe such charge is true," the Board must go to
court and seek an injunction under section 10(1) of the Act.1 3 1
Another possible alternative for the employer is to seek through the
collective bargaining process an express no-sympathy strike clause and
additionally to obtain an agreement which provides for the expedited
arbitration of disputes concerning the scope of the no-strike clause. Al-
though the first provision probably would not circumvent the injunction
prohibition set forth in Buffalo Forge,1 32 it does guarantee that a sym-
pathy strike is an arbitrable issue. This will not only permit the employer
to compel the union to arbitrate the issue, but also will permit the
employer to enforce in federal court injunctive relief awarded by the
arbitrator. 133 Moreover, the expedited arbitration plan effectively pro-
tects the employer from a protracted strike period.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the decision in Buffalo Forge did not fully resolve the con-
flict between section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia and section 301 of Taft-
§ 157 (1970). Although the NLRB has consistently held that a sympathy strike is
presumptively "protected" activity, see Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545
(1962), enforced sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964), the courts have been reluctant to find
such activity protected if the collective bargaining agreement contains an express
no-strike clause which arguably waives the right to engage in a sympathy strike.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Keller-Cresent Co., 538 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1976); Montana-
Dakota Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. L.G.
Everist, Inc., 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189
F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885 (1951). But see, e.g., Gary Ho-
bart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925
(1975); Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850
(1972); General Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1971); Vir-
ginia Stage Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 499 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 856
(1971). See generally Connolly, Section 7 and Sympathy Strikes: The Respective Rights
of Employers and Employees, 25 LAB. L.J. 760 (1974).
128. The term "stranger pickets" refers to individuals who are not members
of the union which has made the no-strike promise under a collective bargaining
agreement.
129. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
130. Id.
131. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970).
132. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
133. See note 118 supra.
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Hartley, it did more fully delineate the requirements which must be
satisfied to obtain a Boys Markets injunction by requiring that the dispute
underlying the strike itself be an arbitrable issue. The result achieved in
Buffalo Forge, however, is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First,
applied in the context of a sympathy strike, it has the potential if not
certain effect of depriving the employer of his bargain. Absent the
availability of injunction relief prior to an arbitrator's decision, manage-
ment has little choice but to employ alternative remedies such as discip-
linary suspensions, expedited arbitration procedures, or direct action
against the stranger pickets. Although these procedures are useful, they
do not provide an adequate substitute for the employer's most potent
weapon of preliminary injunctive relief. Moreover, this decision effec-
tively preempts state courts' jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to re-
strain sympathy strikes and therefore would appear to be inconsistent
with well-established federal labor policies.
A response to the clearly inadequate result achieved in Buffalo Forge
is unlikely to come from the Supreme Court in the near future. Al-
though revision of the Court's policies perhaps will take place, a reversal
such as that between Sinclair and Boys Markets is unlikely. Rather, the
initiative must come from congressional pronouncements on federal
labor policies which could more effectively modify the apparent obstacles
presented by section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.134
GARY M. CUPPLES
134. Senator Robert Griffin (R. Mich.) recently proposed a labor reform bill
which would grant federal courts the power to enjoin strikes in breach of the
collective bargaining agreement through the specific performance of a no-
strike/no-lockout clause. More importantly, the bill contemplates the availability
of injunctive relief notwithstanding the finding by the court that the strike be
over a dispute which the parties have agreed to arbitrate. 123 CoNG. REC. S.
13,302, 13,305 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1977).
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